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SELLING JURIES SHORT
MR. CROwE:

That (Dr. W. A. White's record as a psychiatrist)

is objected to as incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant. The one
purpose of it will be to lay a foundation for him to testify as an
expert on the question of the sanity or insanity of the defendants.
On a plea of guilty your honor has no right to go into that question; as soon as it appears, it is your honor's duty to call a jury.
I insist that the question of sanity or insanity is a matter under the
,law for the jury * * * From the moment you hear evidence on
insanity everything you do becomes of no effect under the law, and
this becomes a mock trial.-(Chicago Tribune, July 31, 1924.)
There seems to be a growing feeling among many influential members of the legal profession that the "mock trial" feature, men-
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tioned by State's Attorney Crowe, is introduced into legal proceedings
not when a judge hears insanity testimony but when so technical a
question is submitted for decision to an untrained jury. To them the
wonder of jury decisions is, as Dr. Johnson said of a horse walking
upon its hind feet, not that it performs its duties well but that it performs them at all. From them comes an insistent demand that all trial
by jury be abolished in the interest of justice and celerity in handing
down decisions.
Recent years have brought considerable qualification of the right of
trial by one's peers; even staunch defenders of trial by jury agree with
the Ohio Supreme Court which, some few years ago, remarked that
although "the state, of course, owes fair and impartial trial and strict
compliance with every guarantee provided by constitution or statute,"
it hardly "owes them the duty of forcing upon them acceptance of all
possible rights and privileges in the face of an express desire to waive
them." The state of Wisconsin among after commonwealths has
adopted into the body of its law this qualification of the right to trial
by jury, eliminating quite largely the compulsory factor, a move sanctioned as early as 1641 by the Massachusetts Body of Liberties Act.
This optional provision has, it is true, resulted in a great deal of
litigation being argued without benefit of jury. Many attorneys feel
that a hearing before a judge will lead to more substantial justice than
appeal to a jury, because of a less well developed tendency to the use
of sensationalism and emotionalism. (Incidentally, however, it might
be remarked that the recent appeal to a Hawaiian jury by Clarence
Darrow was no more emotional a plea than his closing remarks to a
Chicago judge in a much publicized slaying case some years ago). None
the less, jury trial with possibility of waiver at least preserves the privilege of trial by peers to those who believe with the United States Circuit Court of Appeals judge who said, "The jury's prejudices, if they
have any, resulting from varied pursuits and environments, counteract
each other; but with the single judge having no such counterpoise his
bias and prejudice find full and unrestrained expression in his judgments."
A defense of jurymen and jury verdicts could well be developed
along the line of its being a policeman on the street corner, whose good
is measured less by the number of arrests he makes than by the number of crimes his presence prevents. What can happen when judges and
jurists are given undisputed sway is pictured in Senator Beveridge's
monumental "Life of John Marshall:" "Persons were hailed before
national courts charged with offenses unknown to national statutes and
unamed in the Constitution. Nevertheless the national judges held they
* * * This was a substantial assumption of powers. In a manner that

EDITORIAL

were indictable and punishable under the common law of England.
touched directly the lives and liberties of the people, the judges became
lawgivers as well as law expounders."
Courts in that era went so far as to convict a former American
citizen who had become naturalized in France by holding under English doctrine of indelible allegiance no American could expartriate
himself. This particular extension of judicial influence was checked
by legislative fiat. Other arrogations of power might be found illustrating the advisability of keeping some weapons in reserve to protect the
rights of litigants and to safeguard the privileges of attorneys and
barristers. The juryman's existence might find the same justification
given the career of the United States Senator of whom it was remarked
that his value lay not alone in what he had accomplished but in what
his presence had prevented.
Certain it is that great caution should attend any further restriction
or tampering with the institution which Blackstone called, " * * * the

palladium of English liberty, the best criterion for the investigation of
the truth of facts that was ever established in any country." For
although the passing years may have lessened the importance and narrowed the sphere of jury activity, many today still look to "twelve
reasonable men and women" to provide that which Chief Justice John
Jay requested in 1792 (case of Georgia v. Brailsford) when he charged
the jury, "Go, then, gentlemen, from the bar, without any impression
of favor or prejudice for one party or the other, weigh well the merits
of the case, and do on this as you ought to do on every occasion equal
and impartial justice."
Abolition of trial by jury in the fairly immediate future seems
hardly probable; that method of determining issues and questions of
fact does not lack eloquent defenders to say as Joseph H. Choate said
thirty years ago, "So let me say and again upon the same authority
of personal experience and observation that for the determination of
the vast majority of questions of fact arising upon a conflict of evidence
the united judgment of twelve honest and intelligent laymen properly
instructed by a wise and impartial judge who expresses no opinion on
the facts is far safer and more likely to be right than the sole judgment of the same judge would be. There is nothing in the scientific and
technical training of such a judge that gives to his judgment on such
questions superior virtue or value."
ROBERT W. HANSEN

